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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we focus on the usefulness of other comprehensive income (OCI) 
to debt investors. We conceptualize OCI’s usefulness to be its risk relevance. We 
hypothesize that credit risk is associated with OCI volatility and so we contribute 
to the debate whether this volatility is viewed by creditors as capturing useful 
information about debt risk or just “noise.” Specifically, we consider whether 
OCI’s volatility that is linked to accounting standards in the recent two decades is 
associated with cost of debt, non-price terms of debt contracting (i.e. covenants, 
security), capital and maturity structure, and credit ratings. We construct three 
samples to conduct our tests: (1) a new loan sample from Dealscan and (2) a 
comprehensive sample from COMPUSTAT and (3) credit ratings sample.  We 
find strong evidence that higher volatility of OCI is associated with a higher cost 
of debt, higher likelihood of collateral requirement, and stronger credit rationing 
(lower use of debt). We also find statistically significant but economically weak 
evidence that OCI volatility is related to shorter debt maturity and lower credit 
ratings. Overall, our evidence suggests that OCI volatility provides useful 
information to credit markets and shapes debt contracting and the firm’s capital 
structure accordingly.  
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Does the Variability of Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) Play a Role in the 
Determination of Cost of Debt, Capital Structure and Credit Ratings? 
 
1. Introduction  
In this study, we investigate whether the volatility of other comprehensive income (OCI) is related 
to credit risk. Our concentration on OCI’s link to credit risk supplies evidence for reconciling the 
debate about benefits of OCI information to lenders. This debate has recently resurfaced with the 
FASB’s and IASB’s continuing projects on the statement of comprehensive income. Past 
researchers (i.e., Dhaliwal, Subramanyam, Trezevant 1999) and practitioners1 (see Yen, Hirst and 
Hopkins 2007 for a summary of practitioner comments) support the view that the accounting 
adjustments contained in OCI have caused the volatility of OCI to be viewed as “noise” rather than 
decision-useful for investors. Other research (Chambers, Linsmeier, Shakespeare, Sougiannis 2007; 
Black, 2016, Jones and Smith, 2011 and Holthausen and Watts, 2001) provides theoretical support 
for OCI’s decision-usefulness.2 However, the empirical support contained in this stream of research 
focuses on equity investors (Chambers, Linsmeier, Shakespeare, Sougiannis 2007 and Black, 2016) 
but not on creditors.  
Due to asymmetric payoff structure between debt and equity claims, creditors’ risk 
concerns naturally differ from those of equity holders because creditors focus on the safe repayment 
of principal and interest. Therefore, even if firm policies increase the probability of future OCI-
related gains as well as future losses equally, risk deteriorates to creditors due to asymmetric payoff 
structure. We posit that OCI volatility contains useful information about credit risk. For example, 
high OCI volatility may arise due to large current-currency adjustments that indicate not only the 
exchange rate exposure of the firm but also the size of the firm’s foreign operations. OCI volatility 
                                                          
1 See Richard J. Schlueter’s letter for Emerson Electric found at FASB.org comment letter, File 
Reference No. 1790-100, Comprehensive Income.  
2 Skinner (2011) provides theoretical support of OCI’s usefulness to debt holders but no empirical 
support. 
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may also be high due to uncertainty of the funding status of the firm’s pension plan. Since the firm 
assumes the burden of unfunded portion of pension plan liabilities, creditors should be naturally 
concerned about the presence of another claim against the firm’s assets. Finally, OCI volatility may 
also be related to investments in marketable securities creating fair value adjustments to OCI. Facing 
these potential issues, we expect that creditors to respond accordingly to protect the value of their 
claims by imposing higher cost of debt, more restrictive borrowing terms and/or by rationing credit. 
The natural conflict between creditors and shareholders due to asymmetric payoff is further 
exacerbated by asset substitution. Asset substitution occurs when managers borrow money for the 
firm with the promise that the proceeds will be used for investments of a certain level of riskiness 
and then later use the funds for investments with greater riskiness such as larger upside returns but 
also larger downside losses.  This type of investment may benefit equity holders but harm creditors. 
We suggest the projects that the manager might be considering give rise to adjustments to OCI, such 
as expansion of foreign operations, additional investments in marketable securities related to fair 
value adjustments to OCI or motivating the labor force leading to an expansion of the firm’s defined 
benefit plan with the need for more pension assets.3 Since the Federal Reserve System reports $780 
billion in net debt security issuances during the past decade and only $2 billion for equities (Graham, 
Li and Qiu, 2008), addressing the lack of research investigating the risk relevance of OCI for debt 
investors represents a significant opportunity to improve the understanding of OCI’s value in 
promoting the functioning of capital markets.4  
                                                          
3 Many of effects of these investments on OCI volatility are argued to be out of the control of 
management. These include changes in stock prices, affecting marketable securities and the pension 
asset, or changes in currency rates affecting the current-currency adjustment. However the original 
choice to enter into these investments represents a management decision and so we suggest may be 
related to asset substitution. In addition, we suggest that the increase riskiness related to these effects 
as measured by increased OCI volatility may concern creditors.  
4 In an effort to keep the reader focused, we touch briefly on what our paper does not do. Our paper 
does not make arguments on whether volatility of OCI affects the accounting quality of a firm or 
whether OCI numbers should be used in debt contacts. Instead, we test whether the volatility of OCI 
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We motivate the importance of our analyses by three descriptive characteristics of OCI 
volatility from our analysis that should be concerning to the firm’s creditors. First, we find that OCI 
volatility (STD_CHG_AOCI/A) averages 1.2 percent, which is economically significant as it 
amounts to one-fifth of average ROA volatility (6.2 percent). Second, OCI volatility is uncorrelated 
to ROA volatility suggesting that OCI might contain useful credit risk information that is not 
captured by the traditional ROA volatility. Third, we show that OCI is positively correlated to 
market portfolio returns, suggesting that OCI volatility is not eliminated via diversification and 
carries systematic risk. To reinforce our motivation, we provide an illustrative theoretical model in 
Appendix 1. The model shows that when OCI has zero expected value but has positive correlation 
to market returns, even risk-neutral creditors will lower the value of their claims as OCI volatility 
increases. We also discuss that risk-aversion, and agency costs further exacerbate creditors’ 
concerns. Whether or not the capital markets provide support for our theoretical predictions about 
the importance of OCI volatility to creditors is the question that we empirically investigate in our 
research. 
 We test risk relevance of OCI from the perspective of debtholder by starting with a private 
loan sample and extend our analysis to COMPUSTAT samples. First, we use a private loan sample 
to test whether the debt markets perceive the volatility of OCI to contain risk information. Our focus 
on private loans follows from past research showing that firms’ loans from private lenders are harder 
to evaluate than firms’ publicly traded bonds because they have higher credit risk (Diamond 1991; 
Rajan 1992; Denis and Mihov 2003). We consider the association between the volatility of OCI and 
each of the following: (1) the cost of private loans, (2) incidence of loan covenants, (3) collateral 
requirement and (4) the maturity structure of loans. Second, we use a broadly based debt maturity 
sample taken from COMPUSTAT. We investigate the association between the volatility of OCI and 
                                                          
indicates riskiness of a firm in the eyes of creditors that may not be captured by other accounting 
numbers. 
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the following: (1) the maturity structure of debt and (2) leverage. Finally, we investigate the link 
between credit rating and the volatility of OCI based on a COMPUSTAT sample. Our key variable 
is the volatility of OCI (STD_CHG_AOCI/A). We measure STD_CHG_AOCI/A as standard 
deviation of annual change in accumulated other comprehensive income scaled by total assets over 
the past five years. This straightforward measurement of volatility of OCI is consistent with the 
methodology used to measure traditional ROA volatility, commonly used in the literature to proxy 
for riskiness of earnings. We empirically examine whether credit spreads increase, covenants 
become more restrictive, debt usage declines and debt maturity shortens when OCI volatility 
increases. We also test whether credit ratings deteriorate when OCI volatility is higher. We find 
economically and statistically significant evidence that, as OCI volatility increases, the cost of debt 
increases, there is a higher likelihood of collateral requirement and the use of debt decreases. In 
addition, we find statistically significant but economically weak evidence that higher OCI volatility 
results in shorter maturity and lower credit ratings. Overall, our evidence lends support to the view 
that OCI volatility provides useful information about credit quality to debt holders.  
 Our study provides important findings that contribute to the literature investigating the 
decision-usefulness of volatility of OCI. The central debate regarding OCI’s information content to 
debt holders in this literature focuses on whether OCI volatility is simply “noise” or provides 
decision-useful information to debt markets. By showing that higher OCI volatility is associated 
with economically and statistically significant higher cost of debt, higher likelihood of collateral 
requirement and lower use of debt we contribute support for the decision-usefulness of OCI 
volatility information to debt holders.  Our findings imply that OCI volatility provides additional 
useful information regarding credit risk that is not captured by other information proxies. Our 
investigation contributes support to the continued interest by the FASB and IASB through their 
policy deliberations in providing guidance associated with OCI reporting that focuses on the needs 
of creditors (Huang, Lin and Raghunandan 2015).  
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Our study also expands the literature on the role of accounting standards in debt contracting. 
Past literature shows that accounting information plays an important role in shaping debt contracts 
(Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010; Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari, 2008). To the best of our 
knowledge, our paper is the first to document statistically and economically significant effects of 
OCI volatility on the debt financing environment. 
          The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 3 discuss 
sample construction and outlines the research design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 
concludes the study. 
2. Hypothesis development 
Past accounting research supports our argument that the OCI volatility may be perceived as an 
indicator of company risk by investors. Yen, Hopkins, and Hirst (2007) analyze the comprehensive-
income exposure draft comment letters. They conclude that banking organizations opposed the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) proposal for comprehensive-income because they 
claimed that it would trigger "excessive" volatility in comprehensive income, and lead investors 
supposedly to “overstate their risk assessments.” Hodder, Hopkins and Wahlen (2006) then provide 
evidence refuting the claim of potential “overstated risk assessments.” They show the volatility of 
comprehensive income to be more risk relevant compared to the volatility of net income for a sample 
of U.S. banks for the sample period from 1996 to 2004.5 This past research focuses on the usefulness 
of OCI volatility information only to equity investors. However, there are strong theoretical reasons 
to suppose that the needs of creditors may differ from equity investors. We fill a gap in the literature 
by extending the evaluation of the usefulness of OCI information to creditors. Specifically, we 
                                                          
5 Hodder, Hopkins and Wahlen (2006) report that OCI volatility is more strongly associated with 
risk as measured by equity market-model beta, the standard deviation in stock returns, and long-
term interest-rate beta, when compared to the volatility of net income. 
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investigate about the effect of increased OCI volatility induced by recent accounting standards on 
creditors’ perceptions of debt risk. 
The asymmetric payoff structure between creditors and shareholder provides the 
theoretical basis for assuming that creditors’ concerns about OCI’s volatility may differ from 
shareholders. The asymmetric payoff structure between shareholders and creditors implies that 
creditors are not entitled to a proportionate claim on firm value when the firm value is higher than 
the firm’s debt, whereas creditors are at most entitled to firm value when the firm value is lower 
than the value of the firm’s debt. Therefore, this suggests that corporate decisions that contribute to 
firms’ overall earnings volatility (i.e., decisions which increase the probability of future gains as 
well as future losses) impact creditors differently than shareholders. Another implication of our 
argument is that creditors may be especially concerned about additional income volatility captured 
in OCI if OCI does not have any expected positive effect on the firm’s overall earnings (i.e. with 
zero mean). Whether or not debt contracting is influenced by OCI is the empirical question we 
pursue in the paper.6 
When agency costs of debt are considered (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; 
Smith and Warner, 1979), creditors’ concern regarding the value of their claims is further 
exacerbated when firm management acts to advance shareholders’ interests at the expense of 
bondholders’ interests. Specifically, firm management may seek to organize firms’ operations and 
financial structure in ways that increase equity value at the expense of creditors such as committing 
to unexpected high-risk investments (asset substitution). Asset substitution occurs when the firm 
issues debt to finance investment but promises creditors the investment will be low risk investment. 
Then after the debt is issued, firm management ‘substitutes’ high risk investment. The value of 
                                                          
6 Appendix 1 contains an illustrative theoretical model showing that when OCI has zero expected 
value but has positive expected correlation to the firm’s future value, even risk-neutral creditors will 
lower the value of their claims as OCI volatility increases. 
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shareholders’ equity rises because equity benefits from the promise of higher cash flows related to 
the increase in the firm’s risk associated with the increased expected variability of the firm’s 
investment payoffs. However, the increased risk related to the increased variability causes creditors 
to face a potential decline in the expected value of their claims if increased risk causes firm value to 
drop below the value of debt.7 Creditors may take actions to protect themselves from the risks that 
anticipate the risk shifting activities.  The actions we consider in this paper are: increasing the cost 
of financing, requiring covenants and imposing stricter maturity-leverage mix. 
Due to the FASB’s shift towards a comprehensive income approach, the volatility of firm’s 
OCI-related performance measures have increased as a result of the increased number of OCI 
adjustments over time. One outcome is that they may be becoming more sensitive to information 
that reveals higher risk taking or higher degree of asset substitution concerns.  Lenders should favor 
these measures because they tend to be more conservative (Skinner 2011). The OCI adjustments 
include, for example, fair value adjustments from investing or hedging and currency translation 
adjustments from greater internationalization of the firm’s operations. Frequent adjustments to OCI 
resulting in higher OCI volatility can signal management’s efforts to achieve asset substitution 
leading to a greater probability that a firm is not able to fund interest and debt repayments. Lenders’ 
                                                          
7 Asset substitution can be incorporated into the illustrative model discussed in the Appendix 1 by 
making the risk of the operating policy of the firm that is captured by OCI volatility as an 
endogenous choice instead of an exogenous event. In this case, the manager, who is acting on behalf 
of shareholders, has an incentive to make an investment that will introduce volatility, captured by δ, 
to increase the value of the firm’s equity at the expense of creditors. This occurs because the decrease 
in the value of the firm’s debt amounts exactly to the increase in the value of the firm’s equity (i.e. 
kδ). Rational creditors do expect this incentive and will price the firm’s debt at a lower price and 
thus at a higher yield. The change in yield can be approximated by kδ/B for small values δ relative 
to B and for values of k close to 1. If the manager can unboundedly increase the firm’s risk after the 
debt is cast (i.e. there is no upper bound for δ), adverse selection dictates that rational creditors will 
refuse to lend to the firm. We suggest the projects that the manager might be considering, for 
example, are related to foreign operations associated to the current-currency adjustment to OCI, 
additional investments in marketable securities related to fair value adjustments to OCI or expansion 
of the firm’s defined benefit plan. 
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concerns about the implications of higher volatility of OCI infer the imposition of higher costs for 
the firm’s borrowings. Therefore, we have the following expectations on the relation between the 
volatility of OCI and cost of debt. 
HYPOTHESIS 1:  The loan spread is positively related to the volatility of OCI. 
Alternatively, when a lender is concerned about the higher volatility of OCI of a firm, the 
lender may decide to impose more stringent non-price related terms. For example, the lender might 
increase the number of loan covenants, require collateral, impose shorter maturity (Chava, Kumar 
and Warga, 2010; Chambers, Linsmeier, Shakespeare, Sougiannis 2007 and Graham, Li and Qiu 
2008). It is important to note that management may also have an incentive to agree to restrictive 
covenants because rational creditors will price the loan at a lower value (or higher yield) in the 
absence of a commitment to restrictive covenants.8 Therefore, we have the following expectation 
on the relation between the volatility of OCI and flexibility of non-price related loan terms expressed 
in the alternative form:  
HYPOTHESIS 2:  The flexibility provided in non-price related loan terms is negatively 
related to the volatility of OCI. 
 Prior research shows that debt maturity term and leverage can be simultaneously used to 
control for lending risk, resulting in reduced agency costs of the debt (Leland and Toft, 1996; Barnea, 
Haugen, and Senbet, 1980; Rajan and Winton, 1995; Johnson, 2003; Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 
2010). If creditors view increased OCI variability to be new information about the riskiness of the 
firms’ debt, creditors may then demand a shorter maturity structure as OCI increases in volatility. 
                                                          
8 In our illustrative model, creditors’ monitoring costs should be less than kδ for covenants to be 
agreeable by creditors. It is also important to note that in our setup OCI-based financials uncover a 
value-neutral operating policy. It is straightforward to suggest a construct (i.e. set pδup < (1-p)δdown) 
where OCI information reveals a negative effect on the firm value and yet shareholders still have an 
incentive to pursue the value-destroying project at the expense of creditors because the value of their 
claim will always be zero when the firm defaults. In this case, restrictive covenants can improve 
overall firm value as discussed in Smith and Warner (1979) also named as “costly contracting 
hypothesis” 
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A shorter duration of the debt structure means that creditors are better able to monitor management 
actions when it is revealed, for example that returns generated from investments of resources 
received from debt issuances may be riskier than previous expected. This increased variability may 
result from new accounting standards, changes in the firm’s operations or from more thorough 
applications of past standards that subject the firm to more income items classified as OCI. The 
result is in a ‘finer’ view of the firm’s activities.9  
Trade-off theory predicts that firms identify their capital structure by considering benefits 
and costs of debt.  Shortening maturity raises refinancing risk, resulting in a greater potential for 
inefficient liquidation of the firm (Diamond, 1991; 1993 and Sharpe, 1991) or fire-sale of firms’ 
assets (Brunnermeier and Yogo, 2009).  Firms, that have less control over the maturity of their debt 
and are subject to high refinancing risk, may lower their leverage to offset the negative impact of 
the shorter maturity.10 Our predictions about the relationships between the volatility of OCI with the 
maturity structure of the firm’s debt and the firm’s leverage leads to our third and fourth hypotheses 
stated in the alternative forms as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 3:  The portion of short-term debt is positively related to the volatility of 
OCI. 
HYPOTHESIS 4:  The leverage is negatively related to the volatility of OCI. 
Theoretical models provide support for the role of accounting information in determining 
credit risk.  Epstein and Schneider (2008) argue that when the implications of information is difficult 
to judge, investors consider signals ambiguous. Investors update their beliefs with multiple 
likelihoods in mind.  Ambiguous information leads them to perceive a range of signal precisions, 
and respond based on the assessment of the worst-case scenario. Epstein and Schneider (2008) 
                                                          
9 We use ‘finer’ here in the economic sense to imply more disaggregate information.  
10 In addition, trade-off theory predicts lower leverage in a firm that has higher susceptibility of asset 
substitution (Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011). 
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conclude that investors require higher returns for low future information quality so that the more 
uncertain the information quality becomes, the higher are the expected returns.11 We build on their 
finding that the scale of compensation for low information quality is positively related to the 
volatility of fundamentals to suggest that the increased volatility of OCI due to recent accounting 
standards may be increasing the perceived volatility of fundamentals. Higher volatility of OCI 
adjustments may indicate higher asset value measurement uncertainty. Therefore, increased 
volatility of adjustments affecting OCI implies higher likelihood of a firm to default.  
As the leading information providers to debt markets, credit rating agencies may factor the 
OCI uncertainty into credit ratings as earnings volatility is an important factor considered in credit 
rating methodology (Jung, Soderstorm and Yung, 2013). OCI volatility could especially be a useful 
information source for credit rating agencies because it is relatively difficult for managers to 
manipulate OCI compared to the earnings recognized on the income statement. Consistently, Ali 
and Zhang (2009) and Jung, Soderstorm and Yung (2013) report that managers are more likely to 
strategically manipulate earnings (excluding OCI) to maximize (minimize) the firm’s chances of an 
upgrade (a downgrade). Similarly, Alissa, Bonsall, Koharki and Penn (2013) show that income-
increasing earnings management activities tend to occur when the firm’s actual credit rating tends 
to be below the firm’s expected credit ratings. Relying on the firm’s reported income that is subject 
to managerial manipulation to a higher extent, credit rating agencies might use OCI-based earnings 
volatility in assigning the firm’s credit rating. Therefore, we predict the following:  
HYPOTHESIS 5: The credit rating is negatively related to the volatility of OCI. 
3. Sample, variables and research design 
3.1 Sample construction 
                                                          
11 Similarly, Duffie and Lando (2001) conclude that yields spreads are strictly positive even at zero 
maturity if the information is imperfect. These outcomes are due to investors’ uncertainty about the 
default risk of the company. 
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We construct three samples to test our hypotheses. To examine the effect of OCI volatility on loan 
spreads, maturity and covenants, we draw data on new loan issues from Dealscan provided by Loan 
Pricing Corporation. Analyzing new loan issues allows us to measure the impact of OCI volatility 
in an incremental setting that captures the views of creditors when determining the terms of the new 
loan given the firm’s financial health.12 Our second sample is based on the COMPUSTAT universe. 
We use this sample to examine the impact of OCI volatility on capital and maturity structure while 
controlling for potential simultaneity shown previously (Johnson, 2003; Billet, King and Mauer, 
2007). This approach is an alternative to the incremental approach and captures the effect of OCI 
volatility on overall capital structure of the firm. A major advantage of the Dealscan sample is the 
availability of detailed issue specific information that is not available on COMPUSTAT, whereas a 
major advantage of the COMPUSTAT sample is its wider cross-sectional coverage. 
For the Dealscan sample, we merge the issue-specific data to financial accounting 
information from COMPUSTAT. After imposing data availability requirements for variables used 
in the regressions and filtering out financial services firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) due 
to their distinct regulatory environment, we get a final sample of 4,791 issue-year observations based 
on 1,864 unique nonfinancial firms between 2004 and 2011. Our sample coverage starts from 2004 
for computation of the volatility of OCI. We limit the sample year to 2011 because the Dealscan-
COMPUSTAT link file is available only until 2012 (Chava and Roberts, 2008). 
For the COMPUSTAT sample, we identify sample firms by merging COMPUSTAT with 
CRSP and by requiring the necessary financial accounting and stock return information to construct 
the variables used in empirical specifications. We exclude financial services firms (SIC codes 
                                                          
12 Guedes and Opler (1996) suggest that incremental approach might be useful when determinants 
of debt contracting (especially debt maturity) fluctuate over time. Some of the other studies using 
the incremental approach are Brockman, Martin, Unlu (2010), Graham, Li and Qiu (2008), Denis 
and Mihov (2003), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996).  
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between 6000 and 6999). The final sample consists of 20,905 firm-year observations based on 4,241 
unique nonfinancial firms between 2004 and 2014. 
For our credit rating sample, we choose firms with credit ratings from our COMPUSTAT 
sample. We merge the entire COMPUSTAT with CRSP firms having available data required for 
empirical specifications. Consistent with the first two samples, our third sample only includes 
nonfinancial firms. The final credit rating sample contains 9,681 firm-year observations based on 
1,568 unique firms for the period from 2004 to 2014. 
3.2 Variables 
Our primary variable of interest is the volatility of OCI (STD_CHG_AOCI/A), which is defined as 
the standard deviation of annual changes in the accumulated other comprehensive income scaled by 
the book value of assets over the past five years. The variable STD_CHG_AOCI/A captures the 
volatility of income that is not reported on the income statement and parallels the standard volatility 
measure based on ROA used in the literature. However, unlike ROA, higher OCI volatility may 
indicate higher credit risk related to OCI elements such as investments, hedging, foreign currency 
translation and postretirement benefits.  
Our summary statistics reveal that OCI volatility is substantial and important based on 
several measures. Specifically, we find that the average OCI volatility is almost 20 percent of the 
ROA volatility. More importantly, we show that OCI correlates positively to the market portfolio 
with an average correlation coefficient around 0.3, which suggests that OCI volatility carries 
systematic risk.  Though the average annual change in OCI tends to be zero, our summary statistics 
imply that OCI volatility may concern creditors, whose claims are wiped out when the firm is in 
financial trouble and are capped when the firm is financially healthy. Overall, OCI volatility appears 
to be a significant and unique source of income volatility which potentially influences creditors’ 
judgments. 
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To ensure robustness from potentially confounding effects, we control for three variables 
in every specification throughout the paper. First, we control for OCI level (CHG_AOCI/A) to 
capture any OCI income effect. Paralleling the traditionally used ROA calculation, CHG_AOCI/A 
is measured as the annual change in accumulated other comprehensive income scaled by assets. 
CHG_AOCI/A measures the profitability of the firm that is not recognized on the income statement. 
Second, we control for traditionally used profitability (ROA) and third for income volatility 
(STD_ROA) based on the earnings figures reported on the income statement. As discussed later, 
OCI volatility is weakly correlated, if not uncorrelated, to these three variables suggesting 
multicollinearity problems are unlikely to bias our estimates.  
Other control variables are motivated based on past literature and vary for each sample. 
For the Dealscan sample, we control for growth opportunities, leverage, tangibility, firm size, z-
score and various loan characteristics. In the COMPUSTAT samples, we consider asset maturity, 
growth opportunities, unexpected earnings, firm size, credit rating, investment tax credits and 
operating loss carry forward presence. The Appendix 2 provides the calculation details for all of our 
variables. In the next subsection, we discuss our empirical research design. 
3.3 Research design 
3.3.1 Empirical specifications used in the Dealscan sample 
To examine the effect of OCI volatility on debt contracting, we conduct multivariate analyses on 
loan spread (LOG_LOAN_SPREAD), loan covenants (FIN_COV, TOT_COV), loan security 
(SECURED_DUM) and loan maturity (LOG_MATURITY). We use one-period ahead dependent 
variables to ensure that information proxied on the right hand side of the equations is known to 
credit markets at the time of contracting. We estimate specifications below consistent with Graham, 
Li and Qiu (2008). These specifications are single-equation reduced form equations that requires 
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the exclusion of potentially jointly determined dependent variables on the right hand-side of the 
equations.13 
LOG_LOAN_SPREADi, t+1 = β0 + β1STD_CHG_AOCI/Ai,t + Controls { CHG_AOCI/Ai,t + 
STD_ROAi,t + ROAi,t + M_Bi,t +LEVi,t + TANGIBILITYi,t + LOG_SIZEi,t + 
ZSCOREi,t + LOAN_SIZEi,t + PERPRICEi,t + BAA_AAA_SPREADt, + 
TERM_SPREADt, RECESSIONt,} + Dummy variables {Loan type, loan purpose 
and firm} + µit (1)                         
 
FIN_COVi, t+1 (TOT_COVi, t+1) = α0 + α1STD_CHG_AOCI/Ai,t + Controls 
{ CHG_AOCI/Ai,t + STD_ROAi,t + ROAi,t + M_Bi,t +LEVi,t + TANGIBILITYi,t + 
LOG_SIZEi,t + ZSCOREi,t + LOAN_SIZEi,t + PERPRICEi,t + 
BAA_AAA_SPREADt, + TERM_SPREADt, RECESSIONt,} + Dummy variables 
{Loan type, loan purpose and firm} + 
εit (2)  
       
Logit{Prob(SECURED_DUMi,t+1=1)}  =  θ0 + θ1STD_CHG_AOCI/Ai,t + Controls 
{ CHG_AOCI/Ai,t + STD_ROAi,t + ROAi,t + M_Bi,t +LEVi,t + TANGIBILITYi,t + 
LOG_SIZEi,t + ZSCOREi,t + LOAN_SIZEi,t + PERPRICEi,t + 
BAA_AAA_SPREADt, + TERM_SPREADt, RECESSIONt,} + Dummy variables 
{Loan type, loan purpose and firm} +δit     (3)
              
 
LOG_MATURITYi, t+1  = γ0 + γ1STD_CHG_AOCI/Ai,t + Controls { CHG_AOCI/Ai,t + 
STD_ROAi,t + ROAi,t + M_Bi,t  + TANGIBILITYi,t + LOG_SIZEi,t + ZSCOREi,t + 
LOAN_SIZEi,t + PERPRICEi,t + BAA_AAA_SPREADt, + TERM_SPREADt, 
RECESSIONt,} + Dummy variables {Loan type, loan purpose and firm}  
+ ζi,t          (4) 
 
We measure LOG_LOAN_SPREAD as natural logarithm of the spread over LIBOR for each drawn 
down, consisting of the spread of the loan and any annual (or facility) fee paid to lenders. Covenant 
intensity is measured in two ways: FIN_COV and TOT_COV.  The variable FIN_COV is the number 
of financial covenants in the loan agreement whereas TOT_COV is the number of total covenants. 
SECURED_DUM is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the loan facility is secured by 
collateral and zero otherwise. LOG_MATURITY is natural logarithm of the loan maturity, which is 
measured in months. 
                                                          
13 As discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2, past literature shows that maturity and leverage are jointly 
determined therefore we exclude the leverage (LEV) from equation 4 and estimate a reduced-form 
equation. This exclusion does not have any impact on our estimates. 
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Coefficients on STD_CHG_AOCI/A in Equation 1, 2, 3, and 4 are expected to have positive 
signs, suggesting that high volatility of OCI is associated with higher cost of debt, higher number 
of loan covenants, higher likelihood of collateralization (i.e. security) and longer loan maturity 
respectively. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets at year t. STD_ROA is the standard deviation of ROA based on the past five years. Market 
to book value (M_B) is market value of total assets divided by the book value of assets, where market 
value is defined as the sum of market value of equity and book value of liabilities. Leverage (LEV) 
is calculated as debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by total assets.  LOG_SIZE is 
measured as a natural logarithm of market value of assets. Modified Altman's (1968) Z-score 
(ZSCORE) is computed as follows: 1.2*(WorkingCapital)+ 1.4* RetainedEarning+3.3*EBIT+ 
Sales. Modified Z-score does not include the ratio of market value of equity to book value of debt 
since a separate M_B variable is included in the regressions. LOAN_SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of the amount of the loan measured in millions. PERPRICE is an indicator variable taking a value 
of one if the loan facility uses performance pricing and zero otherwise.  
We consider three macroeconomic variables (BAA_AAA_SPREAD, TERM_SPREAD 
RECESSION) to control for economy-wide credit risk, the slope of the yield curve and lack of robust 
economic growth. BAA_AAA_SPREAD measures the average yield difference between AAA rated 
and BAA-rated bonds. All else constant, higher spread implies higher perceived default risk. 
TERM_SPREAD is measured as the difference between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year 
treasury yield. Positive values of TERM_SPREAD indicates upward sloping yield curve and near-
zero or negative values imply flat or inverted yield curves, which tend to occur prior to recessions. 
RECESSION is an indicator variable that equals to one when the loan is issued during a recessionary 
period as identified by National Bureau of Economic Research. 
3.3.2 Empirical specifications used in the COMPUSTAT sample 
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As we indicate in our hypothesis development section, corporate finance theory predicts that the use 
of debt in the capital structure and the maturity of debt is jointly determined. Agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) posits that due to asymmetric payoff structure between debt and equity, 
financial managers, that maximize the value of the firm’s equity, will be incentivized not only to 
reject positive NPV projects but also to accept negative NPV projects at the expense of creditors. 
Rational creditors anticipate these incentives and respond accordingly to protect the value of their 
claims. One mechanism, through which the creditor-shareholder conflict can be mitigated, is 
utilization of shorter-term debt (Myers, 1977). Myers (1977) argues that if debt matures before the 
investment opportunities, creditor-shareholder conflict can be avoided as creditors can renegotiate 
the terms of credit consistent with their incentives. However, a major cost of short-term debt is 
rollover risk, which can materialize if the firm fails to refinance the short-term debt (Diamond, 1991). 
In that case, the firm is required to fully pay for the debt to avoid bankruptcy. The expectation of 
potential rollover risk is a factor that discourages financial managers from using short-term debt 
heavily. Overall, theoretical studies and empirical studies suggest that debt maturity structure and 
leverage are likely to be jointly determined (Barclay, Marx, and Smith, 2003; Johnson, 2003; Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2005; Billett, King, and Mauer, 2007). To jointly test the thir d and 
fourth hypotheses, we estimate following structural equation system using 2SLS on the 
COMPUSTAT sample: 
ST3i,t(ST5i,t) = α0 + α1 STD_CHG_AOCI/A i,t + controls {CHG_AOCI/A i,t + STD_ROAi,t 
+ ROAi,t +  LEVi,t + ASSET_MATi,t  + M_Bi,t +ABNEARNi,t + RATING _DUMi,t + 
REG_DUMi,t + LOG_SIZEi,t +LOG_SIZE2i,t + STD_RET i,t } + Dummy variables 
{year and industry} + εit      (5)
     
 
LEVi,t = β0 + β1STD_CHG_AOCI/A i,t + controls { CHG_AOCI/A i,t + STD_ROAi,t + 
ROAi,t + ST3i,t(ST5i,t) + M_Bi,t+ ABNEARNi,t  + REG_DUMi,t+ LOG_SIZEi,t 
+ITC_DUMi,t + LC_ DUMi,t + STD_RET ,t }+ Dummy variables {year and 
industry} + ζi,t       (6)
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The dependent variables in the maturity equation, ST3 and ST5, measure the proportion of the debt 
maturing in three and five years. Consistent with past literature, ST3 (ST5) is defined as debt in 
current liabilities plus debt maturing in the second year plus debt maturing in the third year (plus 
fourth year plus fifth year) scaled by total debt. Total debt is defined as debt in current liabilities 
plus long-term debt. We expect α1 is to be positive, suggesting that high volatility of OCI is 
associated with the short-term maturity. The main coefficient of interest in the leverage equation is 
β1 with an expected negative sign, suggesting that higher OCI volatility results in lower use of 
leverage. Consistent with the literature, leverage (LEV) is measured as debt in current liabilities plus 
long-term debt divided by total assets. Asset maturity (ASSET_MAT) is based on Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) and measured as the weighted average of long-term asset maturity and current asset maturity. 
The maturity of long-term assets is measured as gross property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) 
divided by depreciation expense while the maturity of current assets is measured as current assets 
divided by the cost of goods sold. Total asset maturity is the weighted sum of these measures where 
gross PP&E/total assets is the weight for long-term assets and current assets/total assets is the weight 
for current assets. Market-to-book ratio (M_B) is market value of total asset divided by book value 
of total asset, where market value is defined as the sum of market value of equity and book value of 
liabilities. Abnormal earnings (ABNEARN) is the difference between earnings at year t and t-1 scaled 
by market value of equity at year t. RATING_DUM captures credit quality of a firm, equaling one 
if a firm has an S&P rating on long-term debt, and zero otherwise. REG_DUM equals one if the 
firm’s SIC code is between 4,900 and 4,939, and zero otherwise. LOG_SIZE is measured as a natural 
logarithm of market value of assets. LOG_SIZE 2 is the squared natural logarithm of market value 
of assets. Return on asset (ROA) is used to control for profitability. STD_RET is the five-year 
standard deviation of stock returns. ITC_DUM equals one if the firm has an investment tax credit, 
and zero otherwise. LC_DUM equals one if the firm has operating loss carry forward, and zero 
otherwise.  
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To deal with the over-identification restrictions, we use the square of firm size 
(LOG_SIZE2), asset maturity (ASSET_MAT), the rated-firm dummy (RATING_ DUM), and 
expected marginal tax rate proxies (LC_ DUM and ITC_DUM) as instrumental variables and treat 
the rest of the excluded variables as exogenous. Our results remain unchanged when we use the full 
set of excluded variables as instruments however the p-value for the over-identification tests become 
less than 10 percent and therefore we do not report those estimations in our main tables. 
Alternatively, we also estimate the system (unreported) using limited information maximum 
likelihood (LIML) method that is robust for violation of over-identification restrictions (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 1993; Mariano, 2001; Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Greene, 2003) and find that our 
results remain robust under LIML as well. 
3.3.3 Empirical specifications used in the credit ratings sample 
Turning to the credit rating analysis, we estimate a specification similar to that in Lee (2008). Our 
control variables are consistent with Standard & Poor’s rating criteria and aim to capture the overall 
creditworthiness and the firm’s capacity to satisfy its financial obligations. The ordered-logit 
specification is shown below: 
Ordered Logit {LEAD_RATINGSPi,t }= β0 + β1STD_CHG_AOCI/A i,t + Controls 
{CHG_AOCI/A i,t + STD_ROAi,t +ROAi,t + INTCOVi,t + RATINGSPi,t + LEVi,t + 
LOG_SIZEi,t  + STD_RETi,t }+ Dummy variables {year and industry} + µi,t   (7) 
        
 
The dependent variable is 12-month-ahead S&P credit ratings (LEAD_RATINGSP) relative to the 
end fiscal year month. To the extent that the credit rating agency might not immediately respond to 
the information embedded in volatility of OCI, we consider the 12-month-ahead rating as the 
dependent variable. Ratings are code numerically between 1 and 22, where 22 represents an AAA 
rating and 1 represents a D rating. We expect a positive coefficient for β1 suggesting that higher OCI 
volatility is associated with lower credit quality. To correct for the autocorrelation in ratings, we 
control for the lagged credit rating score (RATINGSP). Inclusion of a persistent lagged dependent 
variable, however, exacerbates the collinearity problem with the firm dummies. Therefore, in this 
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specification instead of using a parametric approach we control for unobserved firm-level fixed 
effects by clustering the standard errors at the firm level.  
Other control variables are OCI level, ROA, ROA volatility, leverage, size, stock return 
volatility and interest coverage ratio (INTCOV). INTCOV is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation and interest expense divided by interest expense. Other variables are measured as 
previously defined. In the next section, we discuss the results of our estimations. 
4. Results 
4.1. Tests of H1: Volatility of OCI and credit spreads 
We test the relation between volatility of OCI and credit spreads using the Dealscan sample. Table 
1 provides summary statistics for the Dealscan sample. A review of loan characteristics found in 
Panel A shows that the average loan has 202 basis points spread over LIBOR with an average size 
of 2.9 million dollars. A loan agreement contains two financial covenants on average and matures 
in 4.2 years (52 months). While 65 percent of the loans have a security provision, 77 percent of them 
contain performance pricing provisions. 
Turning to firm characteristics, we find that the average ROA, market-to-book and leverage 
are 3.0 percent, 1.73 and 16.5 percent respectively. The average log-size of 0.728 corresponds to a 
firm size of USD 2.07 billion, suggesting that Dealscan sample coverage is somewhat skewed 
towards larger firms relative to that of COMPUSTAT sample (median firm size in COMPUSTAT 
sample is $1.5 billion). Regarding the industry breakdown of the sample, manufacturing industry 
(1-digit SIC = 2 and 3) represents more than 40 percent of the sample firms, while agriculture 
industry has the smallest presence at 0.48 percent. These statistics are comparable to previous 
studies utilizing Dealscan data.  
Panel C provides Pearson correlation coefficient estimates among OCI-based and 
traditional measures of income level and volatility. Our primary variable of interest, 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A, is not statistically significantly correlated to (ρ= -0.011) ROA volatility 
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(STD_ROA), suggesting that information content of these two variables do not overlap. Therefore, 
any information that OCI volatility captures is unlikely to be reflected by ROA volatility.14 The 
strongest correlation occurs between STD_ROA and ROA at -0.311 followed by the correlation 
between OCI volatility and OCI level at -0.110. Both of these coefficients are statistically and 
economically less than 1, suggesting that information content of these variables are sufficiently 
distinct from each other. 
Lastly, Panel D provides the average and median figures for the firm-level Pearson 
correlation coefficients (CORR_OCI_VWCRSP) between OCI (CHG_AOCI/A) and market returns 
(based on CRSP value-weighted returns) estimated over the previous five years. Contrary to the 
noise view, we find that OCI is positively related to market returns. The average and median 
correlation estimates are 0.351 and 0.453 and these estimates are statistically significant based on t-
test and Wilcoxon rank test (p-value = 0.000). Positive OCI correlation to the market returns 
suggests that OCI carries systematic risk, which should be a concern to the firm’s creditors. 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the credit spread regressions. Model 1 considers 
only OCI-based and traditional measures of income level and volatility and fixed effects. Model 2 
adds the firm and loan characteristics with loan type, purpose and firm effects. Model 3 and 4 add 
the macroeconomic variables. In all four models, we find that OCI volatility is positively and 
significantly related to credit spreads.  
These results are economically significant both on a relative and absolute basis. It is 
important to note that OCI volatility coefficient estimates (STD_CHG_AOCI/A) are substantially 
larger than those for ROA volatility (STD_ROA). This suggests that for a 1 percent change in OCI 
versus ROA volatility, loan spreads will be much more sensitive to OCI volatility than to ROA 
                                                          
14 Whether the information content of OCI volatility is purely noise is the empirical question we 
pursue in the paper and, our evidence implies that OCI volatility provides useful risk-related 
information to credit markets. 
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volatility.15 More specifically, Model 4 results suggest that log-spreads are much for sensitive to 
OCI volatility relative to ROA volatility by a factor of 10.45 (3.962/0.379 = 10.45). Therefore, 
holding the size of the change constant, it is clear that credit spreads are more highly sensitive to 
OCI volatility than they are to ROA volatility. 
When economic significance is evaluated on an absolute basis, we find that when OCI 
volatility increases from 5 percent to 95 percent of the sample distribution, spreads increase by 
roughly 17 percent, which implies an increase of 34 bps (30 bps) for the mean (median) spread of 
202 (175) bps. For the similar increase in ROA volatility, Model 4 results suggest that credit spreads 
increase by 1.6 percent or 3.2 bps (2.8 bps) based on the sample mean (median). These findings 
suggest that OCI volatility is priced as a risk factor into credit spreads and thus are not treated as 
pure noise by creditors. 
4.2. Tests of H2: volatility of OCI and non-price related terms of loan agreements 
In this section, we examine how other aspects of debt contracting might be affected due to OCI 
volatility. If creditors demand higher spreads due to higher OCI volatility, they might also require 
tighter covenants, collateral posting or shorter maturities. Table 3 presents our estimation results. 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 3 show that OCI volatility is not statistically significantly related 
to covenant intensity. Given the results in Demerjian (2011) that balance sheet covenants have lost 
their popularity in the past decade, we reconstruct the dependent variable by only counting the 
balance sheet covenants (i.e. net worth, debt ratio) and find that OCI volatility remains unrelated to 
balance sheet-based covenant intensity. We do not find a statistically significant relation between 
ROA volatility and covenant intensity, although the slope coefficient has the expected positive sign.  
Model 3 shows the estimation results for the logit specification, modeling the probability 
of collateral presence in the loan agreement. Similar to credit spread results, we find that both OCI-
                                                          
15 We realize that 1 percent change in volatility is less likely to occur for OCI volatility compared 
to ROA volatility.     
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based and traditional income volatility measures are positively related to the presence of collateral. 
More importantly, collateral presence is much more sensitive to OCI volatility (θ1 = 45.576) relative 
to ROA volatility (coefficient estimate for STD_ROA= 11.045). Turning to the economic 
significance, when OCI volatility changes from 5 percent to 95 percent of the empirical distribution, 
probability of collateral requirement increases from 52 percent to 88 percent, which is economically 
significant given that the unconditional probability of observing collateral requirement is 65.2 
percent.16  
Finally, Model 4 of Table 3 shows the results of the loan maturity regressions. We find that 
income volatility (neither OCI-based nor traditional) does not have a statistically significant 
influence on loan maturity. Credit spread, term spread and loan size appear to be the factors that are 
significantly related to loan maturity with expected signs.   
Overall, our analyses based on incremental empirical setting suggest that creditors use cost 
of borrowing and requiring collateral as their primary tool in responding to high OCI volatility. We 
do not find statistically significant evidence that covenants and loan maturity are used to mitigate 
the risk captured by OCI volatility. Taken together, these results support the view that OCI volatility 
provides useful risk-related information to creditors. 
4.3 Tests of H3 and H4: volatility of OCI with maturity and capital structure  
We start our analyses by providing summary statistics for the COMPUSTAT sample. Panel A of 
Table 4 shows the distributional characteristics of the variables used in simultaneous equation 
specifications. The average for ST3 and ST5 are 44 percent and 62 percent, confirming the heavy 
use of short-term debt in corporate capital structure. These statistics are consistent with Harford, 
                                                          
16 We evaluate predicted probabilities based on the coefficient estimates of Model 3 in Table 3. The 
non-linearity of logit specification requires calibrating a baseline model. We calibrate the baseline 
model using the mean values of the right-hand side variables. To ensure that fixed effects do not 
skew the predicted probability of the baseline model, we calibrate the fixed effects so that the 
predicted probability equals to the unconditional probability of collateral requirement (i.e. 65.2 
percent). 
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Klasa and Maxwell (2014), who report a secular increase in the use of short-term debt between 1980 
and 2007 for a large sample of US firms.  
We find that the distributions of earnings level and volatility measures are quite comparable 
to those of the Dealscan sample. Specifically, the averages (medians) for STD_CHG_AOCI/A and 
STD_ROA are 1.4 percent (0.6 percent) and 10.2 percent (3.9 percent) respectively and the averages 
(medians) for CHG_AOCI/A and ROA are -0.02 percent (0 percent) and -2.1 percent (3.5 percent) 
respectively. Regarding other firm characteristics, the average (median) for LEV, ASSET_MAT, 
M_B, ABNEARN, is 0.25 (0.22), 11.9 (7.06), 1.80 (1.44) and 0.01 (0.004) respectively. These 
statistics are comparable to those reported in the prior literature and for the Dealscan sample.  
Panel B shows the correlation coefficient estimates among the conventional and OCI-based 
profitability and volatility measures in the COMPUSTAT sample. We find that the correlation 
structure is virtually similar to that of the Dealscan sample. Most importantly, OCI volatility 
(STD_CHG_AOCI/A) is not correlated to ROA volatility (STD_ROA), suggesting that OCI volatility 
does not reflect the same information content of ROA volatility. 
Panel C confirms the positive correlation structure between OCI and market returns for the 
Compustat sample. Specifically, the average and median values for the firm-level correlation 
between OCI and market returns are 0.289 and 0.338, which are statistically significant at 1 percent 
(p-value = 0.000). Consistent with the Dealscan sample, we conclude that OCI carries systematic 
risk and is a potentially useful source of information for creditors. 
Panel D of Table 4 reports the annual average figures for OCI volatility (first row for 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A) and OCI-component volatility (bottom five rows). COMPUSTAT 
subcategorizes accumulated other comprehensive income under five categories: (1) unrealized 
derivative gains/losses, (2) pension/postretirement adjustments, (3) adjustments to marketable 
securities, (4) translation adjustments and (5) other adjustments not included in the previous 
components. To ensure comparability to STD_CHG_AOCI/A, we calculate the component volatility 
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measures over the past five years for annual changes in the components scaled by the book value of 
assets.17  
It appears that average overall OCI volatility (STD_CHG_AOCI/A) increases from 0.8 
percent in 2004 to 1.2 percent in 2014, while peaking at 1.7 percent between 2008 and 2011. This 
pattern is largely applicable for all component volatilities except for STD_CHG_DERI/A and 
STD_CHG_OTHER/A that seem to have a flat trend. Volatilities of pension/post-retirement 
adjustments (STD_CHG_PEN/A) and translation adjustments (STD_CHG_TRANS/A) appear to be 
the main drivers of the OCI volatility. 
Panel E of Table 4 shows the industry distribution of our sample based on 1-digit SIC codes. 
Consistent with prior literature, manufacturing firms (1-digit SIC = 2 and 1-digit SIC = 3) make up 
roughly 50 percent of the sample whereas, agriculture (N = 83) and public administration services 
(N = 467 industries contribute the least to the sample.  
Table 5 reports the simultaneous equation results for maturity and leverage related to H3 
and H4.  In both panels, Columns 1 and 2 provide coefficient estimates for the short-maturity and 
leverages equations respectively. In Panel A, short-term debt maturity is proxied by the proportion 
of debt maturing in three years (ST3) whereas in Panel B, ST5 is used. In the maturity equation of 
Panel A, the coefficient on STD_CHG_AOCI/A is positive (α1 = 0.359) and significant at 1 percent 
(p-value = 0.002), which is consistent with H3. This finding suggests that holding the leverage 
amount constant, maturity of debt in the capital structure declines as the volatility of OCI increases. 
Put differently, creditors are less likely to fund the firm with long-term debt as OCI volatility 
increases. Turning to the leverage equation, we find that a negative (β1 = -0.341) and significant 
                                                          
17 For variable names, we use the similar mnemonics as in OCI volatility (STD_CHG_AOCI/A) for 
OCI components. STD_CHG_DERI/A, STD_CHG_PEN/A, STD_CHG_MSA/A, 
STD_CHG_TRANS/A and STD_CHG_OTHER/A are used to name unrealized derivative 
gains/losses, pension/postretirement adjustments, adjustments to marketable securities, translation 
adjustments and other adjustments respectively. 
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relation at 1 percent (p-value = 0.000) between OCI volatility and leverage, which is consistent 
with H4. Paralleling the maturity results, these findings suggest that, holding maturity structure of 
debt constant, high-risk borrowers identified by high OCI volatility can borrow less from credit 
markets, reflecting creditors’ concerns about risk. 
In Panel B, we find similar results using the maturity measure of ST5. In the maturity 
equation, the slope coefficient for STD_CHG_AOCI/A is positive (α1 = 0.286) is positive and 
significant at 5 percent (p-value = 0.020). In the leverage equation, we find that STD_CHG_AOCI/A 
is negatively and significantly (β1 = -0.350 and p-value = 0.000) related to leverage. Coefficients 
on control variables are generally consistent with the prior research (Johnson, 2003; Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2005; Billett, King, and Mauer, 2007). 
Regarding the economic significance of OCI volatility-maturity relation, we find that when 
OCI volatility changes from 5 percent to 95 percent of the sample distribution, ST3 and ST5 increase 
by 1.8 percent and 1.5 percent respectively. Given the median levels of 34 percent and 67 percent 
for ST3 and ST5, we believe that these results are weakly significant. However, when we evaluate 
the economic significance for the effect of OCI volatility on leverage, we find that leverage 
decreases by roughly 1.8 percent when OCI increases from 5 percent to 95 percent of the sample 
distribution. Given that the median leverage is 22.4 percent in the COMPUSTAT sample, we 
conclude that the effect of OCI volatility on leverage is economically significant, supporting the 
view that credit becomes less available for firm with significant OCI volatility.  
Overall our results suggest that, volatility of OCI influences the firm’s capital structure. 
Specifically, when faced with high-risk borrowers as revealed by high OCI volatility creditors 
protect the value of their claims primarily by reducing their exposure to the firm and secondarily 
by imposing shorter maturities. The results support our claim that the volatility of fair value 
adjustments plays an important role in shaping the firm’s capital structure.  
4.4 Tests of H5: volatility of OCI and credit ratings 
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Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the credit rating sample. Panel A shows the mapping scale 
used in assigning credit ratings ranging from AAA (RATINGSP = 22) to D (RATINGSP = 1) and 
Panel B shows the summary statistics used in the sample. The credit ratings sample coverage is 
skewed for large firms as the median firm size is $633 million. This bias is expected as small firms 
tend not to get credit ratings. The mean (median) of RATINGSP is 11.47 (11.00), indicating that 
more than half of the sample firms have above- investment grade credit rating. Regarding volatility 
and profitability variables, the mean (median) for STD_CHG_AOCI/A and STD_ROA are 1.7 
percent (1.0 percent) and 4.6 percent (2.6 percent) and, the mean (median) of CHG_AOCI/A and 
ROA are -0.2 percent (0.0 percent) and 3.6 percent (4.2 percent). In unreported results, we verify 
that the correlation structure among these variables as well as the sample industry distribution are 
virtually the same as the Dealscan and less restricted COMPUSTAT samples. Next, we discuss the 
ordered-logit regression results in Table 7. 
Consistent with our previous findings, we show that the coefficient on STD_CHG_AOCI/A 
is negative and significant, indicating that the higher OCI volatility is associated with the lower 
credit ratings. This finding contrasts with our results for ROA volatility where we find no 
statistically significant association between ROA volatility and credit ratings. We also find that both 
OCI (CHG/AOCI/A) and ROA (ROA) are positively related to credit ratings, suggesting that credit 
ratings are sensitive to both OCI-based and traditional measures of income. Most of the other control 
variables have the expected signs. Specifically, we find that higher lagged-credit ratings, lower 
leverage and larger firm size are associated to higher credit ratings. 
When we evaluate the economic significance, we find that economic significance of the 
credit rating results is marginal. When OCI volatility changes from 5 percent to 95 percent of the 
sample distribution, odds of a notch increase in credit ratings credit ratings (LEAD_RATINGSP) 
decline by 12.2 percent. Overall, we conclude that although publicly available credit ratings are 
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somewhat sensitive to OCI volatility, it appears that the privately generated information by credit 
markets has a strong influence on debt contracting. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study we investigate the association between risk information contained in other 
comprehensive income (OCI) and the firm’s cost of debt, non-price terms of debt contracting, 
capital and maturity structure and credit ratings. We explore the relationship by conducting tests 
with three different samples: a Dealscan sample based on new loan issues, a comprehensive 
COMPUSTAT sample and a credit ratings sample. The sample period is from 2004 to 2014.  We 
find that higher volatility of OCI is statistically and economically significantly associated with high 
cost of debt, higher probability of collateral requirements and lower use of debt. We also find 
statistically significant but economically weak evidence that higher OCI volatility is related to 
shorter debt maturity and lower credit ratings. Our evidence disagrees with the view that OCI-based 
income is predominantly noise to creditors. Rather, our results suggest that OCI-based income 
provides useful information to credit markets and influences various aspects of debt contracting. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by documenting statistically and economically significant 
effects of OCI volatility on the debt contracting environment. We also contribute support to the 
continued interest by the FASB and IASB to provide OCI reporting guidance that focuses on the 
needs of creditors. 
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Appendix 1 
An Illustrative Model 
 
One can show that even if creditors are risk-neutral and agency costs are absent, any additional 
income volatility captured by OCI volatility (with zero expectation), that carries systematic risk, 
will reduce the value of creditors’ claims. In the spirit of Fama and Miller (1972), a simple one-
period model might be useful to illustrate our point. Consider the financing problem of a firm that 
will operate for one year and then be liquidated at the end of the year. The firm will issue debt that 
will be paid back in one year with face value of B. Initially, investors form their expectations about 
the future firm values by analyzing the firm’s non-OCI related information set. We assume that the 
future value of the firm can attain two possible values of Vup and Vdown with probabilities of p and 
1-p respectively. To ensure that the firm’s debt is risky, we require that B > Vdown. In the up-state 
shareholders (creditors) get Vup-B (B) and in the down-state shareholders (creditors) get 0 (Vdown) 
as there are no bankruptcy costs. The fair values of the firm’s equity and debt will be the present 
value of next year’s expected payoff discounted at the appropriate rate, therefore: 
    Value of equity when OCI information is unaccounted for = k [p(Vup –B) + (1-p)(0)] = kp(Vup –
B) 
    Value of debt when OCI information is unaccounted for = k [pB + (1-p)(Vdown)] 
    Value of the firm = The sum of the values of equity and debt = k[pVup + (1-p)Vdown] 
where k = 1/(1+r) and r is the appropriate annual risk-free rate. We assume risk-neutrality for capital 
market participants therefore the appropriate discount rate becomes the risk-free rate. Imposing risk-
aversion, makes our predictions stronger as the discount rate will be higher than the risk-free rate 
since the current price will reflect additional discounting due to risk-aversion. Suppose that the 
firm’s operating policies imply that the true liquidation value of the firm’s assets can attain Vup + 
δup and Vdown – δd in the up and down states respectively. More importantly, we assume that 
expectations using this additional piece of information can only be formed by analyzing OCI-related 
financial statements. To ensure that OCI has zero expected effect on the firm value (consistent with 
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the empirical evidence), we set δup= δ/p and δdown= δ/(1-p), where δ>0. δ captures the magnitude of 
expected OCI volatility as it is directly proportional to OCI volatility (i.e. Standard deviation of OCI 
= [p(δ/p)2 + (1-p)[δ/(1-p)]2]1/2 = δ/[p(1-p)]0.5). Consistent with the findings in Panel D of Table 1 
and Panel C of Table 4, this perturbation structure ensures that OCI is positively related to the firm’s 
value or OCI reveals information that contributes to the firm’s systematic risk (i.e. asset value is 
larger (lower) at the up-state (down-state) when market portfolio tends to be higher (lower) 
consistent with the stylized evidence that typical stock has a positive beta.  
When OCI information is accounted for, the values of the claims will be as follows: 
    Value of equity when OCI information is accounted for = k [p(Vup –B + δ/p) + (1-p)(0)] = kp(Vup 
–B) + kδ 
    Value of debt when OCI information is accounted for = k [pB + (1-p)(Vdown- δ/(1-p)] = k [pB + 
(1-p)(Vdown)] - kδ 
In order to conclude that creditors will be concerned about OCI volatility, it suffices to show that 
the fair value of the debt declines when creditors account for the information content of OCI. When 
OCI information is considered, the decline in the fair value of the debt can be stated as: 
    Decrease in the value of debt when OCI information is accounted for = kδ 
Overall, when creditors account for OCI volatility, the value they assess for the firm’s debt declines 
and this decline is proportional to the expected magnitude of OCI volatility. 
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Appendix 2 
Variable Definitions  
 
Main treatment variable of interest 
STD_CHG_AOCI/
A 
Standard deviation of CHG_AOCI/A based on the past five years. 
 
Variables used in the Dealscan sample 
Dependent variables 
LOG_LOAN_SPREA
D 
Natural logarithm of the spread over LIBOR for each dollar drawn 
down, consisting of the spread of the loan and any annual (or facility) 
fee paid to the bank group. 
FIN_COV The number of financial covenants in the loan agreement. 
TOT_COV The number of total covenants in the loan agreement. 
SECURED_DUM 
An indicator variable taking a value of one if the loan facility is secured 
by collateral and zero otherwise. 
LOG_MATURITY 
Natural logarithm of the loan maturity. Maturity is measured in 
months. 
  
Control variables 
CHG_AOCI/A 
Change (from year t-1 to t) in accumulated other comprehensive 
income scaled by total assets at year t. 
STD_ROA  Standard deviation of ROA based on the past five years.  
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at year t. 
M_B 
Market value of total assets divided by the book value of assets, where 
market value is defined as the sum of market value of equity and book 
value of liabilities. 
LEV Debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by total assets. 
TANGIBILITY Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. 
LOG_SIZE 
Natural logarithm of market value of assets in USD billions. Market 
value of assets is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and 
book value of liabilities as of the fiscal year end. 
ZSCORE 
Modified Altman's (1968) Z-score: 1.2*(Working Capital)+ 1.4*  
Retained Earnings+3.3*EBIT+ Sales. 
LOAN_SIZE 
Natural logarithm of the loan size. Size is measured as loan facility 
amount in million dollars. 
PERPRICE 
An indicator variable taking a value of one if the loan facility uses 
performance pricing and zero otherwise.  
BAA_AAA_SPREAD The difference between average yields of BAA and AAA rated bonds. 
TERM_SPRED 
The difference between 10-year Treasury yield and the 2-year treasury 
yield. 
RECESSION 
An indicator variable taking a value of one if the observation occurs in 
a recession. 
Loan type dummies Dummy variables for different loan types. 
Loan purpose 
dummies 
Dummy variables for different loan purposes. 
CORR_OCI_VWCRS
P 
Correlation coefficient between contemporaneous OCI and market 
returns (based on CRSP value-weighted index) calculated over the past 
five years. 
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Variables used in the COMPUSTAT sample 
Dependent variables 
ST3 (ST5) 
Debt in current liabilities plus debt maturing in the second year plus 
debt maturing in the third year (plus those of in the fourth and fifth 
years) scaled by total debt. Total debt is defined as debt in current 
liabilities plus long-term debt. 
LEV Debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Control variables 
CHG_AOCI/A 
Change (from year t-1 to t) in accumulated other comprehensive 
income scaled by total assets at year t. 
STD_ROA  Standard deviation of ROA based on the past five years.  
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at year t. 
ABNEARN 
(Earnings at year t - earnings at year t-1)/ market value of equity at 
year t. 
ASSET_MAT 
The maturity of long-term assets is measured as gross property, plant, 
and equipment (PP&E) divided by depreciation expense while the 
maturity of current assets is measured as current assets divided by the 
cost of goods sold. Total asset maturity is the weighted sum of these 
measures where (gross PP&E/total assets) is the weight for long-term 
assets and (current assets/total assets) is the weight for current assets. 
ITC_DUM 
An indicator variable taking a value of one if the firm has an 
investment tax credit, and zero otherwise. 
LC_DUM 
An indicator variable taking a value of one if the firm has operating 
loss carry forward, and zero otherwise. 
LOG_SIZE 
Natural logarithm of market value of assets in USD billions. Market 
value of assets is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and 
book value of liabilities as of the fiscal year end. 
LOG_SIZE2 Squared natural logarithm of the market value of assets. 
M_B 
Market value of total assets divided by the book value of assets, 
where market value is defined as the sum of market value of equity 
and book value of liabilities. 
RATING_DUM 
An indicator variable taking a value of one if the firm has an S&P 
long-term debt rating, and zero otherwise. 
REG_DUM 
An indicator variable taking a value of one if the firm’s SIC code is 
between 4,900 and 4,939, and zero otherwise. 
STD_RET  
Standard deviation of monthly stock returns during the past five 
years. 
CORR_OCI_VWCRSP 
Correlation coefficient between contemporaneous OCI and market 
returns (based on CRSP value-weighted index) calculated over the 
past five years. 
 
Variables used in the credit rating sample 
Dependent variable 
LEAD_RATINGSP  12-month-ahead long-term S&P rating relative to the fiscal year end. 
Control variables 
CHG_AOCI/A 
Change (from year t-1 to t) in accumulated other comprehensive 
income scaled by total assets at year t. 
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STD_ROA  Standard deviation of ROA based on the past five years.  
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at year t. 
INTCOV  
Operating income before depreciation and interest expense divided 
by interest expense at year t. 
LEV Debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by total assets. 
LOG_SIZE 
Natural logarithm of market value of assets in USD billions. Market 
value of assets is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and 
book value of liabilities as of the fiscal year end. 
RATINGSP  Current long-term S&P rating at the fiscal year end. 
STD_RET  Standard deviation of stock returns during the past five years. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for the Dealscan sample 
Panel A and B show the summary statistics and industry breakdown respectively. Panel C shows the correlation estimates among OCI based and conventional volatility and 
profitability. Panel D shows the average and median levels of firm-level correlation between OCI and market (CRSP value-weighted index) returns calculated over the past 5 years. 
Sample period is 2004-2011. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix 2. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the Dealscan sample 
Variable N Mean Std Median Min 5% 25% 75% 95% Max 
Loan characteristics           
LOAN_SPREAD 4,791 201.978 136.221 175.000 17.500 37.500 100.000 275.000 450.000 950.000 
LOG_LOAN_SPREAD 4,791 5.063 0.754 5.165 2.862 3.624 4.605 5.617 6.109 6.856 
FIN_COV 4,791 2.040 1.022 2.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.000 4.000 6.000 
SECURED_DUM 4,791 0.652 0.476 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MATURITY 4,791 52.223 18.516 60.000 3.000 12.000 37.000 60.000 84.000 96.000 
LOG_MATURITY 4,791 3.850 0.543 4.094 1.099 2.485 3.611 4.094 4.431 4.564 
LOAN_SIZE 4,791 2.944 0.075 2.950 2.675 2.805 2.898 2.997 3.054 3.114 
PERPRICE 4,791 0.775 0.417 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
           
Firm characteristics           
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 4,791 0.012 0.015 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.042 0.120 
CHG_AOCI/A 4,791 0.000 0.017 0.000 -0.114 -0.028 -0.002 0.004 0.024 0.092 
STD_ROA 4,791 0.062 0.093 0.031 0.002 0.006 0.015 0.068 0.226 1.004 
ROA 4,791 0.030 0.100 0.043 -0.721 -0.144 0.012 0.077 0.142 0.341 
M_B 4,791 1.725 0.844 1.480 0.620 0.937 1.183 2.007 3.371 7.047 
LEV 4,791 0.165 0.152 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.244 0.484 0.706 
TANGIBILITY 4,791 0.309 0.245 0.230 0.007 0.034 0.108 0.468 0.803 0.937 
LOG_SIZE 4,791 0.750 1.585 0.728 -3.575 -1.867 -0.372 1.849 3.374 5.154 
ZSCORE 4,791 1.484 1.404 1.561 -6.781 -0.659 0.712 2.340 3.508 5.600 
           
Macro-economic variables           
BAA_AAA_SPREAD 4,791 1.072 0.450 0.920 0.620 0.660 0.870 1.160 1.680 3.380 
TERM_SPREAD 4,791 0.974 0.982 0.690 -0.140 -0.110 0.100 1.770 2.720 2.830 
RECESSION 4,791 0.155 0.362 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
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Panel B: Industry breakdown of the Dealscan sample  
1-digit SIC Industry definition N % 
0 Agriculture 23 0.48% 
1 Mining, oil and const. 401 8.37% 
2 Food, beverage and chemicals 791 16.51% 
3 Plastics, computer and machinery 1,255 26.19% 
4 Transportation 662 13.82% 
5 Wholesale and retail 709 14.80% 
7 Arts, recreations, technical services 632 13.19% 
8 Healthcare, professional and education services 310 6.47% 
9 Public administration services 8 0.17% 
  Total 4,791 100% 
Panel C: Correlations among OCI-based and conventional volatility and profitability measures 
  STD_CHG_AOCI/A CHG_AOCI/A STD_ROA ROA 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 1.000    
CHG_AOCI/A -0.110*** 1.000   
STD_ROA -0.011 -0.016 1.000  
ROA -0.028** 0.099*** -0.311*** 1.000 
Panel D: Average and median firm-level correlation (CORR_OCI_VWCRSP) between OCI and market (CRSP value-weighted index) returns 
Variable N Mean p-value (H0: Mean =0) Median p-value (H0: Median =0) 
CORR_OCI_VWCRSP 4,791 0.351 0.000 0.453 0.000 
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Table 2 
Relation between cost of loan and OCI-based volatility 
This table shows the estimation results for the regression of firm’s cost of loan. The sample covers 
the 2004-2011 period. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix 2. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at two- digit industry code level are used to determine statistical 
significance. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable =LOG_ LOAN_SPREAD 
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
 Coefficient 
p-
value 
 Coefficient 
p-
value 
 Coefficient 
p-
value 
Intercept 5.223*** 0.000  10.253*** 0.000  9.919*** 0.000  9.905*** 0.000 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 3.454*** 0.000  14.636*** 0.000  4.824** 0.011  3.962** 0.031 
             
Firm characteristics            
CHG_AOCI/A -2.971*** 0.000  -2.158*** 0.000  -1.457** 0.018  -0.949* 0.077 
STD_ROA 0.963*** 0.000  0.866*** 0.008  0.414* 0.060  0.379* 0.079 
ROA -0.626*** 0.007  -0.658** 0.047  -0.247 0.379  -0.277 0.341 
M_B -0.078*** 0.002  -0.352*** 0.000  -0.127*** 0.009  -0.108** 0.024 
LEV 0.894*** 0.000  0.516*** 0.003  0.226 0.145  0.182 0.246 
TANGIBILITY -0.082 0.392  0.057 0.896  -0.229 0.321  -0.270 0.224 
LOG_SIZE -0.177*** 0.000  0.136** 0.047  -0.080 0.183  -0.071 0.193 
ZSCORE -0.066*** 0.000  -0.023 0.685  -0.033 0.438  -0.027 0.529             
Loan characteristics         
  
LOAN_SIZE    -1.503*** 0.000  -1.583*** 0.000  -1.620*** 0.000 
PERPRICE    -0.136*** 0.004  -0.109** 0.017  -0.110** 0.015             
Macroeconomic variables           
BAA_AAA_SPREAD       0.211*** 0.000  0.324*** 0.000 
TERM_SPREAD       0.292*** 0.000  0.296*** 0.000 
RECESSION          -0.200*** 0.000             
Loan Type Dummies No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Loan Purpose Dummies No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Dummies No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.313  0.688  0.800  0.803 
N 4,791  4,791  4,791  4,791 
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Table 3 
Relation between other loan characteristics (non-price terms) and OCI-based volatility 
This table shows the estimation results for covenant intensity, collateral presence and maturity 
specifications. The sample covers the 2004-2011 period. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix 2. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at two- digit industry code level are 
used to determine statistical significance. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Independent variable 
Dependent variables 
FIN_COV  TOT_COV  SECURED_DUM  LOG_MATURITY 
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
 Coefficient 
p-
value 
 Coefficient 
p-
value 
 Coefficient 
p-
value 
Intercept 4.253*** 0.002  10.968*** 0.002  21.813 0.179  -0.699 0.314 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 2.941 0.311  -2.674 0.644  45.576* 0.065  0.569 0.385 
             
Firm Characteristics          
  
CHG_AOCI/A 0.100 0.941  1.585 0.669  -17.639 0.212  0.262 0.705 
STD_ROA 0.011 0.976  1.170 0.353  11.045* 0.074  0.041 0.777 
ROA -0.424 0.481  0.504 0.678  7.254 0.128  0.109 0.525 
M_B -0.007 0.931  -0.190 0.232  -0.140 0.805  -0.015 0.585 
LEV 0.313 0.508  0.654 0.536  -1.341 0.785    
TANGIBILITY 0.097 0.862  -1.119 0.381  0.663 0.869  0.110 0.723 
LOG_SIZE -0.053 0.620  -0.369* 0.075  -2.490*** 0.004  0.023 0.691 
ZSCORE 0.065 0.355  -0.247 0.140  -2.675*** 0.002  0.018 0.545             
Loan Characteristics          
  
LOAN_SIZE -0.882* 0.046  -2.181* 0.052  -8.113 0.120  1.535*** 0.000 
PERPRICE 0.290*** 0.000  0.444*** 0.009  0.474 0.388  0.037 0.253             
Macroeconomic Factors         
  
BAA_AAA_SPREAD -0.005 0.957  0.119 0.555  2.686*** 0.007  -0.111*** 0.003 
TERM_SPREAD -0.039 0.102  -0.186*** 0.005  0.346 0.118  -0.037*** 0.002 
RECESSION 0.048 0.616  0.236 0.349  -0.941 0.201  -0.028 0.532 
            
  
Loan Type Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
Loan Purpose Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
Firm Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
R2 0.663   0.755   0.456  0.647 
N 4,791   4,791   828  4,791 
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Table 4 
Summary statistics for the COMPUSTAT sample 
Panel A shows the summary statistics for the primary sample that has 21,034 firm-year observations based on 
4,241 unique nonfinancial firm from 2004 to 2014. Panel B shows correlations among STD_CHG_AOCI/A, 
CHG_AOCI/A, STD_ROA and ROA.  
Panel C shows the mean and median correlation between OCI and market returns (CRSP value-weighted index) 
over the past five years. Panel D shows the volatility of change in AOCI components broken down by fiscal 
year. Component volatilities are calculated over the past five years for annual changes in unrealized derivative 
gains/losses (STD_CHG_DERI/A), pension/postretirement adjustments (STD_CHG_PEN/A), adjustments to 
marketable securities (STD_CHG_MSA/A), translation adjustments (STD_CHG_TRANS/A), and other 
adjustments not included in the previous components (STD_CHG_OTHER/A). Panel E shows the industry 
breakdown of the primary sample based on one digit SIC. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix 2. 
All variables are trimmed at 0.5% and 99.5% of each variable’s empirical distribution.  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the primary sample 
Variable N Mean Std Median Min 5% 25% 75% 95% Max 
ST3 20,905 0.442 0.372 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.844 1.000 1.000 
ST5 20,905 0.620 0.361 0.667 0.000 0.001 0.314 1.000 1.000 1.000 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 20,905 0.014 0.020 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.019 0.051 0.350 
CHG_AOCI/A 20,905 -0.002 0.021 0.000 -0.152 -0.036 
-
0.004 
0.003 0.025 0.123 
STD_ROA 20,905 0.102 0.605 0.039 0.002 0.006 0.018 0.093 0.309 40.007 
ROA 20,905 -0.021 0.277 0.035 
-
12.034 
-0.399 
-
0.017 
0.072 0.146 0.555 
LEV 20,905 0.250 0.190 0.224 0.000 0.004 0.101 0.358 0.610 0.998 
ASSET_MAT 20,905 11.939 18.373 7.064 0.126 0.868 3.116 15.511 34.376 468.164 
M_B 20,905 1.803 1.319 1.439 0.396 0.808 1.114 2.031 3.926 36.244 
ABNEARN 20,905 0.011 0.268 0.004 -2.959 -0.237 
-
0.026 
0.031 0.273 2.965 
STD_RET 20,905 10.856 6.253 9.225 2.725 4.141 6.537 13.337 23.199 48.920 
RATING_DUM 20,905 0.387 0.487 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
REG_DUM 20,905 0.037 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 20,905 9.173 23.132 1.512 0.001 0.037 0.300 6.219 45.430 215.385 
LOG_SIZE 20,905 0.318 2.146 0.414 -6.989 -3.309 
-
1.205 
1.828 3.816 5.372 
LOG_SIZE2 20,905 4.706 5.643 2.450 0.000 0.029 0.561 6.931 16.879 48.846 
ITC_DUM 20,905 0.160 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LC_DUM 20,905 0.508 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Correlations among conventional and OCI based profitability and volatility 
  STD_CHG_AOCI/A CHG_AOCI/A STD_ROA ROA 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 1    
CHG_AOCI/A -0.146*** 1   
STD_ROA -0.000 0.016** 1  
ROA 0.049*** -0.005 -0.234*** 1 
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Panel C: Average and median firm-level correlation (CORR_OCI_VWCRSP) between OCI and market (CRSP value-
weighted index) returns 
Variable N Mean p-value (H0: Mean =0) Median p-value (H0: Median =0) 
CORR_OCI_VWCRSP 20,905 0.289 0.000 0.338 0.000 
 
Panel D: Average volatility of OCI components broken down by fiscal year 
Variable 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.012 0.012 
Median OCI-component volatility          
STD_CHG_DERI/A 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
STD_CHG_PEN/A 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 
STD_CHG_MSA/A 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
STD_CHG_TRANS/A 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.006 
STD_CHG_OTHER/A 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
Panel E: Industry breakdown of the primary sample  
1-digit SIC Industry definition N % 
0 Agriculture 83 0.40% 
1 Mining, oil and const. 1,814 8.68% 
2 Food, beverage and chemicals 4,141 19.81% 
3 Plastics, computer and machinery 6,370 30.47% 
4 Transportation 2,777 13.28% 
5 Wholesale and retail 2,268 10.85% 
7 Arts, recreations, technical services 2,496 11.94% 
8 Healthcare, professional and education services 909 4.35% 
9 Public administration services 47 0.22% 
  Total 20,905 100% 
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Table 5 
Relation between maturity/leverage and OCI-based volatility 
Simultaneous equation estimates  
This table shows the simultaneous equation results for two specifications that model the firm’s use of debt and 
the maturity structure simultaneously. Panel A and B proxy maturity structure based on ST3 and ST5 
respectively. Each system treats leverage (LEV) and maturity structure (ST3, ST5) endogenously. The sample 
covers the 2004-2014 period. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix 2. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Joint estimation results for ST3 and LEV 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable 
ST3  LEV 
[1]  [2] 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.466*** 0.000  0.381*** 0.000 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 0.359*** 0.002  -0.341*** 0.000 
CHG_AOCI/A -0.118 0.299  -0.165** 0.016 
STD_ROA 0.002 0.631  -0.006** 0.014 
ROA 0.021** 0.044  -0.066*** 0.000 
ST3 
  
 -0.408*** 0.000 
LEV -0.237*** 0.000    
ASSET_MAT -0.007*** 0.000    
M_B 0.010*** 0.000  -0.009*** 0.000 
ABNEARN -0.035*** 0.000  -0.006 0.211 
RATING_DUM -0.167*** 0.000    
REG_DUM 0.035** 0.013  -0.042*** 0.000 
LOG_SIZE -0.033*** 0.000  0.010*** 0.000 
LOG_SIZE2 0.009*** 0.000    
ITC_DUM 
 
  -0.038*** 0.000 
LC_DUM 
 
  0.011*** 0.000 
STD_RET 0.005*** 0.000  0.007*** 0.000 
        
Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
R2 0.228 
 
0.175 
N 20,905 
 
20,905 
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Panel B: Joint estimation results for ST5 and LEV 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable 
ST5  LEV 
[1]  [2] 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.646*** 0.000   0.510*** 0.000 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 0.286** 0.020   -0.350*** 0.000 
CHG_AOCI/A -0.164 0.159   -0.167** 0.033 
STD_ROA 0.002 0.615   -0.006** 0.025 
ROA 0.026** 0.012   -0.052*** 0.000 
ST5 
  
  -0.488*** 0.000 
LEV -0.215*** 0.000     
ASSET_MAT -0.001*** 0.000     
M_B 0.001 0.608   -0.008*** 0.000 
ABNEARN -0.020** 0.025   -0.009 0.148 
RATING_DUM -0.160*** 0.000     
REG_DUM -0.056*** 0.000   -0.047*** 0.000 
LOG_SIZE -0.019*** 0.000   0.008*** 0.000 
LOG_SIZE2 0.002*** 0.000     
ITC_DUM 
 
   -0.036*** 0.000 
LC_DUM 
 
   0.018*** 0.000 
STD_RET 0.004*** 0.000   0.006*** 0.000 
      
Year dummies Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
R2 0.160  0.136 
N 20,905  20,905 
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Table 6 
Summary statistics for credit rating sample 
Panel A shows the mapping of long-term S&P credit ratings on RATINGSP. Panel B shows the summary 
statistics for the credit rating sample that has 9,681 firm-year observations based on 1,568 unique nonfinancial 
firm. The sample covers the 2004-2014 period. 
 
Panel A: Mapping of credit ratings onto RATINGSP 
Investment grade  Speculative grade 
S&P rating RATINGSP  S&P rating RATINGSP 
AAA 22  BB+ 12 
AA+ 21  BB 11 
AA 20  BB- 10 
AA- 19  B+ 9 
A+ 18  B 8 
A 17  B- 7 
A- 16  CCC+ 6 
BBB+ 15  CCC 5 
BBB 14  CCC- 4 
BBB- 13  CC 3 
   C 2 
   D, SD 1 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Min 5% 25% 75% 95% Max 
RATINGSP 9,681 12.388 12.000 3.273 1.000 8.000 10.000 15.000 18.000 22.000 
LEAD_RATINGSP 9,681 12.332 12.000 3.331 1.000 7.000 10.000 15.000 18.000 22.000 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A 9,681 0.017 0.010 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.023 0.055 0.314 
CHG_AOCI/A 9,681 -0.002 0.000 0.023 -0.151 
-
0.042 
-0.006 0.004 0.028 0.121 
STD_ROA 9,681 0.046 0.026 0.066 0.002 0.005 0.014 0.052 0.155 1.206 
ROA 9,681 0.036 0.042 0.090 -2.283 
-
0.083 
0.014 0.075 0.139 0.393 
INTCOV 9,681 18.406 7.697 76.071 
-
142.938 
2.332 4.758 14.245 47.306 2939.720 
LEV 9,681 0.216 0.190 0.145 0.000 0.027 0.106 0.294 0.508 0.704 
LOG_SIZE 9,681 1.973 1.885 1.420 -1.898 
-
0.305 
0.932 2.974 4.450 5.372 
STD_RET 9,681 8.275 7.045 4.696 2.725 3.560 5.124 9.893 17.400 46.499 
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Table 7 
Relation between credit ratings and OCI-based volatility 
This table shows the ordered-logit regression results for credit ratings. Dependent variable is 12-
month ahead S&P credit ratings (LEAD12_RATINGSP). Credit ratings are mapped as a number 
ranging between 22 (AAA) and 1 (D). The sample covers the 2004-2014 period. Variable definitions 
are provided in the Appendix 2. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level are 
used to determine statistical significance. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: LEAD_RATINGSP 
Coefficient p-value 
STD_CHG_AOCI/A -2.364** 0.017 
CHG_AOCI/A 2.744*** 0.001 
STD_ROA 0.165 0.631 
ROA 3.366*** 0.000 
INTCOV 0.000 0.952 
RATINGSP 2.795*** 0.000 
LEV -3.312*** 0.000 
LOG_SIZE 0.241*** 0.000 
STD_RET -0.016* 0.091 
   
Year dummies Yes 
Industry dummies Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.603 
N 9,681 
 
